The protocol to this agreement was born from the first meeting of the advisory committee established by the agreement. Each party recognized that additional arrangements for non-military vessels could improve their effectiveness. In the protocol signed on May 22, 1973 in Washington, D.C, each side pledged not to carry out simulated attacks on other people`s non-military ships. In the late 1960s, several incidents broke out between the U.S. Navy and the Soviet Navy. These include aircraft from the two nations passing by each other, colliding ships and aircraft that make threatening movements against those on the other side. In March 1968, the United States proposed discussions on preventing such incidents. The Soviet Union accepted the invitation in November 1970 and the discussions were held in two cycles – October 1, 1971 in Moscow and May 17, 1972 in Washington, D.C. The agreement was signed in 1972 by Navy Minister John Warner and Soviet Admiral Sergey Gorchkov at the Moscow Summit. In short, while an INCSEA agreement can theoretically reduce the possibility of miscalculations in the event of unreaseded maritime encounters between U.S. and Chinese maritime forces, there are many reasons why the United States should not pursue such an agreement. First of all, unlike the Soviet Navy, the PLA Navy is not a blue navy with a global scope and responsibility. Putting the NAVY PLA on such stature would not be in the best interest of the United States.
Second, the United States and the Soviet Union shared a common interest in freedom of navigation and access to the world`s oceans. The interpretations of the law of the sea by the United States and China are diametrically opposed and cannot be reconciled. Third, INCSEA is a navy agreement to the navy. However, the majority of the CPP`s nuisances and aggressive behaviour against U.S. vessels are carried out by non-military PRC police and civilian officers (e.g. B, small cargo ships and fishing trawlers). An INCSEA agreement would not apply to these vessels and aircraft. Fourth, INCSEA is an instrument of the Cold War. Defining relations between the United States and China in this way would be counterproductive for both nations. Fifth, because of its activities in the seas near the last decades, China can hardly be described as a responsible actor of the state. Its actions in the South China Sea, in particular, are contrary to the spirit and intent of INCSEA and reflect a series of broken promises, intimidation and aggressive behaviour towards its neighbours.